Section VII: Maneuvering

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.
2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.
3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.
7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.
10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.
11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.
14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.
15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.
16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest.
18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immovability like a mountain.
19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.
21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.
24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.
25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.
26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.
30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of retaining self-possession.
31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.
32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying circumstances.
33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
37. Such is the art of warfare.

The maneuver of a platoon is the crux of an attack and defence. Previous sections discussed fighting itself, its applications and its philosophies. Maneuvering is not fighting. It is the seed of fighting, but distinct from it. Though not part of combat, the preceding maneuver will determine the outcome of all firefights.

Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.

Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.

A leader is the most influential person on the field. He has claim to certain responsibilities which he must grasp with sound strategy and tactics. It is a macroscopic art of balance.

After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

Theory is easy; the execution, difficult. All things are in motion. All objects in motion are unstable. Greater motion means less stability. This is why defence is easier to manage than attack, and why a focused attack is easier to manage than a dispersed one.

Your objective in attacking maneuvering is:

A large amass of force.

An overwhelming maneuver.

A transition to defence in which the objective is taken, held, and all maneuvering ceases.

Your objective in defensive maneuvering is to prevent the above.

Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.

Though the one that maneuvers heads towards defeat, the victor of battle is the one that outmaneuvers his enemy.

Thus the apparent paradox.

Explaining this paradox cannot be done in words. It is to be experienced in motion.

Know this paradox, and you know strategy, tactics, and war. Further reading would no longer be required.

Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

Victory is in coordination. Coordination above all things. Discipline cannot be achieved by 31 strangers. It depends on a leader.

If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

A reminder on the importance of expansion and contraction. Speed and stillness. Form and emptiness. All aspects of a paradox that presents itself during maneuvering.

Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.

The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

Skilled players will often-times run ahead of the advance. They achieve nothing. Call back over-eager rambos. Name them and shame them. Do anything to prevent their suicide.

If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.

If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.

The greater the distance, the slower your advance.

Remember the mantra: slow is smooth, smooth is fast.

Here follows vital information to consider while maneuvering:

We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

Is a spawn-site secure and sustainable?

If we cannot spawn efficiently, or if a counter-attack is focused on repairing the AAA, these things must be addressed first.

We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.

What is the progress of adjacent platoons?

There would be little point in attacking letters if only one platoon is able to do so.

We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.

What is the nature of the map? How can it be manipulated to our advantage?

Impart your knowledge to newer players and tell to fight on ground that is most effective. Firefights away from objectives favour the defence.

Use your experience. The best leaders have the greatest experience and have vetted through all three PMCs.

In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.

All warfare is based on deception.

Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.

All deception is based on situational maneuvering.

Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest.

In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immovability like a mountain.

Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

Though the mastery of warfare is akin to the mastery of paradox, there must be no ambiguity in the efficacy of your actions. All force must be focused and overwhelming.

When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.

Remember that victory is platoon wide. Though a stronger squad may initiate a victory, it is the other three squads that are required to support them.

Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.

Remember you must stop before you start. The emptiness of stillness is what determines the decisiveness of action.

Be creative according to what your intuition says of the situation.

The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.

Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.

Remember that it all depends on how effectively you use your broadcast.

The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.

In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

Your goal is for everyone to have the same ideas, the same approach, the same execution. This is the root of overwhelming force.

Time these broadcasts. Be absolutely clear in purpose, design and reasoning.

A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

A reminder about morale. Without morale, victory is impossible

In war, the human heart must become rigid.

Because it becomes rigid, it is fragile.

Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

Leadership means understanding the dance of mind, heart and spirit. Understand the morale of the meta-being of a platoon.

A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

Do not forget the warfare is a combat involving people. Not only are your men combating the enemy, they are combating themselves.

Victory and defeat is a state-of-being. It comes from within.

As it's eminence, an army's leader must possess this state of being in its purest form. This is what makes him a leader.

An incompetent leader is a disgrace.

Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of retaining self-possession.

Inner peacefulness is thus what leads to victory.

It is the reason why emptiness and stillness is the root of effective maneuvering.

The leader is the one that has mastered himself.

To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.

Greater strength borne from greater emptiness.

To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying circumstances.

Greater clarity borne from greater emptiness.

All warfare is based on deception.

Deception of the enemy is based on mastery of self.

Mastery of self is based on understanding of energy.

Understanding of energy is based on knowing profound emptiness.

As the sutra says:

"Form is nothing more than emptiness, emptiness is nothing more than Form. Form is exactly emptiness, and emptiness is exactly Form"

Thus,

It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

Such is the art of warfare

Section VI: Weak Points and Strong

1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted.
2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.
3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.
5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked.
8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.
10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.
13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided.
14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.
15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.
18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.
20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest are separated by several LI!
21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.
22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.
25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.
26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.
31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.
34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.

In a game with such overwhelming numbers, the effect of individual skills is diminished. Victory or defeat depends on strength meeting weakness. To disperse away from enemy strongholds and pour into their weak points. A platoon always fails when the men do the opposite.

Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted.

Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.

Just as a platoon is expected to contract and expand, a squad is expected to start and stop. Soldiers need to learn how to position themselves to attack or defend. Positioning is the key to winning individual firefights. Choose your firefights with extreme discrimination.

If you undertake careless firefights, you simply waste time, ammo, health, and everything else that you value as a soldier.

By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

Positioning your squad in defence....

...must be in direct line of the enemy advance.

...must be difficult to flank.

...must push the enemy spawn-source as far back as possible.

...must be easily replenished by your own defensive spawn-source.

A defence succeeds when it can hold objectives while remaining still; it fails when it is forced to maneuver.

Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.

An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.

An attacking maneuver...

...must avoid all unnecessary combat.

...must always find a flank.

...must charge in from nearby cover with overwhelming force.

An attack succeeds when it takes an objective with a single swift maneuver; it fails when its momentum is forced to a standstill.

Success and failure is witnessed concurrently in a single point of transition.

That is:

when attackers may stop maneuvering to hold and defend; and when defenders are forced to maneuver and counter-attack.

Such is the nature of start-stop.

You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked.

Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.

Success depends knowledge of enemy positions and maneuvers. Proaction and reaction are a in constant motion.

O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.

Every soldier must do his utmost to prevent revealing his position to the enemy.

You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.

Never engage on ground that is not near an objective or spawn-point.

If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

Never attack an enemy that is static. Force him to move.

If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.

Never advance upon enemy an when you need to defend. Force him to move and come to you.

By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided.

Always use espionage. Always keep together.

Learn what triggers a red dot over your head. Learn what happens when you go alone. It is common sense.

We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.

And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

Numbers > Skill

The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

Overwhelming, maneuvering force > Numbers

For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

Strategic placement of static defenders > Maneuvering force

Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.

Thus,

Force attackers into predictable channels.

Force defenders into displacement.

Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

Victory and defeat thus depends on skill, numbers, movement and stillness. Master them all, but understand the economy.

Finally, then, the reason that we play MAG. Skill is shown to be the asset of least strategic value.

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest are separated by several LI!

A platoon is built upon squads, a squad is built upon soldiers. A platoon cannot depend on individuals

.

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.

Memorise the economy of platoon-level warfare. Do prioritise a lower over a higher.

Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.

Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.

Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.

Execution is always a reactionary response to enemy disposition.

In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

Make your own plans difficult to decipher.

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

If you are able to evolve constantly to the situations that present themselves to you, the above is easy.

All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.

Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.

Only great leaders can appreciate the nuances of platoon-level warfare.

But what of himself?

A PL's responsibilities extend far, far outside that of simple skill.

To succeed in this post, a PL must sacrifice himself as a soldier and focus solely upon leadership.

Such is the nature of all leadership.

Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

The stages of war unfolds by itself. What is happening has happened before. It will happen again.

So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.

In the end, all things in warfare are simple, elegant and predictable.

But only for those who understand it.

Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.

Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

Let the grunts fight it out between themselves. Direct them where and how to fight.

Learn from the Past.

And understand the Present.

Recognise the Present.

And predict the Future.

It is an elegant unfolding with its own unique beauty.

He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.

Section V: Energy

1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.
5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.
7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.
11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.
14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.
15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.
19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.
22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.
23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

The Art of War is rooted in Taoism; Tao is rooted in Heaven and Earth; thus the Infinite. When the Infinite settles into our consciousness, it separates into Yin-Yang. All things material presents as yin or yang. Yang is expansion; yin is contraction. Yang is attack; yin is defence. Yang is aggression; yin is calm. And so on.

When Yin meets Yang, there is a state of wu-wei, or mu, or emptiness. In emptiness lies Tao. In war, emptiness exists during periods of transition. On either side of transition, yang-becomes-yin, yin-becomes-yang: it is a transfer of energy.

In all forms of war, key events occur due to transitions in energy. Transition of energy is the crux of all warfare.

Know emptiness, contemplate Tao, and you will understand war.

Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.

Leadership is leadership. An incompetent leader must never lead, ever. You must not apply for SL if you are not ready for PL or OIC. Failure of leadership, on any level, is a disgrace.

It is a truth of the human heart that men will never follow a weak leader.

To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.

Direct and indirect, like the transition of yin to yang to yin.

That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.

Weak and strong, also yin against yang.

In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

If you do not attack, you will fail. If you overextend an attack, you will fail. If you do not press a successful attack, you will fail. Yang becomes yin becomes yang.

Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

There is only one correct strategy; there are many possible tactics.

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.

There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.

There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.

Tactics are many. All are basic. Some are too basic to be named. Even the most complex maneuvers are fundamentally basic.

In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.

Understand that all maneuvers are a result of creativity. Creativity is birthed by emptiness. All ideas of emptiness are unique and perfect to a situation.

The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

Learn to expand and contract, as fluidly and frequently as you breathe.

The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.

The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

An army of Tao is irresistible.

Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.

See the enemy, contemplate the situation, and strike.

Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.

Yin, Yang, Tao and Heaven will give you your order.

Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.

The common soldier will witness this and be struck in awe. For a warrior, the silence of emptiness sings a unique song.

Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.

All warfare is based on deception.

Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

Know emptiness and you already know what your enemy will do in any situation. Use it to your advantage.

The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.

All men have a role to play.

All men are musicians.

But not all men can dance to Tao.

And thus, all warfare unfolds to its own music, its unique notes and its elegant prose:

When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.

Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height.

So much on the subject of energy.

Section IV: Tactical Dispositions

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.
2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.
8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"
10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.
16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

MAG is not simply a first-person shooter. To an aspiring leader, it is something else entirely. It is one thing to know how to shoot someone in the face. It is another thing to know how to win strategically.

Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.

Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

The attacking platoon leader must not rely on brute force to break down an enemy's front line. He will allow himself windows of 90-120 seconds each attack; every cycle he will analyse the situation. He is firstly to command his platoon to eliminate basic strategic errors that his platoon is making. Only when this is eliminated will be scour the enemy to find their mistakes. A defence will only succeed if it makes NO mistakes. Against a competent attack, this is in fact impossible.

Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.

Not knowing how is the greatest crime in the game.

It is the responsibility of senior players, when not in the position of command, to seek a demotion incompetent leaders.

Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

The reality is, regardless whether you are the attacker or defender, your platoon must go through a cycling process of attack and defence. It is a neverending process of expansion and contraction. Understanding the timing of the transition is a combination of experience, intuition and leadership.

The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

Defence requires solid soldier placement. Attack depends upon aggression.

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

Remove your ego when it comes to victory or defeat. Warriors sprout from the springs of humility.

What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.

The only way a leader wins a match is to inspire his soldiers to do the right things. This is simple. Coordinate them as a group and instruct them when they do stupid things. Nothing is ever achieved by one man doing it all. He only has two arms and two legs, doesn't he? An army's achievements is a combination of small acts of service.

He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

A leader must know what common mistakes look like. If you instruct others of their mistakes, give them a reason. They will stop. If nobody makes mistakes, you win. It is your voice broadcasting on their speakers that is the key to victory.

Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

The process of victory is to formulate a plan that is both simple and effective. If it is simple and effective, the plan is idiot-proof and mistake-proof.

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.

Remember:

Moral law means the passion to win, maturity, personal qualities: how willing the men are to follow a one man into combat.

Method means planning, perfect in simplicity and effectiveness.

Discipline means the degree of teamwork and elimination of common mistakes.

In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

Planning requires the following steps:

(1) Know the map.

(2) Disperse troops.

(3) Define a. strategy and b. tactics

(4) Give leeway for randomness: randomness in events, randomness in discipline and randomness in skill. Luck.

(5) Press favourable outcomes, or else retreat and regroup.

Or, in attack:

(1) Understand which flank is best to approach

(2) Overcommit to that flank.

(3) a. commit the bulk of troops towards an isolated bunker with overwhelming force and b. commit skilled players to an alternative route to find a hidden flank

(4) Pray

(5) Press any advantage.

Or, in defence:

(1) Order flanks and roadblocks/gates to be overprotected until enemy's attack pattern is apparent.

(2) Position troops where confrontation is to your maximum advantage.

(3) a. commit troops and engage from cover, thereby stopping the advance in its tracks, followed by b. commit skilled players to find alternative routes and counterattack from a hidden flank

(4) Pray

(5) Press for a counterattack; but do not overcommit yourself.

A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

Section III: Attack by Stratagem

1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.
2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.
3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.
7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:--
13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.
15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
    1. He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
    2. He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
    3. He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
    4. He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
    5. He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

This chapter is dedicated to attack, but will also be relative for a defensive counter-attack.

MAG allows us to excel in many areas. We all fall under the same bell-curve, and thus, by definition, we are all average shooters. There are no 'good' or 'exceptional' soldiers in this game; here, a man is judged by how well he can take an objective.

A match begins with the attacker's first strike. Remember this point. The attacker is white. The match is in his hands.

Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.

Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

An attacker's success lies in avoiding unnecessary combat.

A defender's objective, thus, is to engage the enemy with overwhelming force over the most suitable terrain.

A K/D ratio is a complete fabrication of your weak ego. You will be judged by your ability to take and hold objectives.

A perfect attack means a 0-0 score and all objectives taken.

A perfect defence is completely situational.

An attacker must contemplate all the meanings of without fighting. Smoke, gas, bunkerspawn killing, sabotage, etc. It does not include sniping.

Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.

Anticipate the enemy's plan to defend (or at least, a random noob's tendencies) and flank them. Failing that, force defenders to scamper across their line.

The minute you are forced to fire your weapon, you are strategically losing. If you force the enemy to grit his teeth to defend an objective, strategically speaking, you have already lost.

The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

Avoid, at all costs, a direct and frontal attack. Use your broadcast to elucidate this to your men.

Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

The key is not to kill, the key is to remain unkilled and complete the objective.

A company that cannot be killed is by definition 'invincible'.

An invincible company that can complete objectives is by definition a pantheon of gods.

It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.

Find where the defender is naturally isolated and flank him, with overwhelming force.

An unorganised attacker fails because the soldiers isolate themselves. In effect, they are already destroying themselves. An isolated attacker is ripe for a counter-attack if the defender uses the attacker's principles.

Thus soldiers must be taught: when in numbers, strike in full view; when alone, use espionage. Both methods, used effectively, will demoralise equally. However, only a platoon-scale strike can hold an objective.

Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

A reminder, here, that moral strength given by the PLs and the OIC will determine the effectiveness of the attack; and for that matter, the defence.

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:--

(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.

Learn when it is time for the platoon to commence platoon-level (counter-)attack. By committing a full platoon to one objective, you are concurrently neglecting another.

(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.

You are not a king. Do not act like it. Request, don't demand. Inspire, not insult. If you broadcast harshly, you will lose respect.

(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

If you are OIC, analyse the PLs. If you are PL, analyse your SLs. If they are below par, then the men have already lost faith in them. Be prepared to demote them verbally over broadcast. No-one will step down voluntarily. Be prepared to take over. Be prepared to abandon your squad, or your platoon; move to another; even if they are on the other side of the map:

But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.

Remember, this is a game, and in real life we are all randoms. Your subordinates have the choice not to follow your orders. Some never will. Randoms will hear your broadcast and discredit you. 127 people will judge you as a person.

What will determine how well you lead the men is your ability to be a leader in real life.

Study leadership principles that apply in business and enterprise.

Minors and women will find it uphill. It is an unfortunate reality.

Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:

He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.

He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.

He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.

He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.

Broadcast the situation to the men, and act accordingly; remember to be flexible. "They are doing A, so we will do B, but don't forget tactic C. Mark your targets, think quick and be aggressive".

Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.